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Abstract
This paper models the relationship between inﬂation and steady state growth in
a model combining standard Schumpeterian growth with a standard New Keynesian
speciﬁcation of nominal price rigidity. Positive money growth has two clear-cut coun-
tervailing eﬀects on the incentive to innovate. Past price rigidity causes the use of an
ineﬃciently large quantity of cheap old intermediate goods, reducing demand for new
ones and hence, the incentive to innovate. Future price rigidity erodes the new good’s
relative price, increasing demand and therefore the current incentive to innovate. In
numerical calibrations the negative eﬀect of inﬂation on growth dominates.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The eﬀects of money on the real side of the economy remain a ﬁeld of heated discussion
in economics and politics. In particular, price stability is one of the key aims of monetary
policy in developed countries where the need for low inﬂation is often justiﬁed citing a
conjectured detrimental eﬀect of inﬂa t i o no ne c o n o m i cg r o w t h .
A host of papers empirically investigates the relationship between the growth rate
of money supply or the inﬂation rate1 and the economic growth rate in the long run.2
Earlier studies, using mostly cross-country data, found no signiﬁcant correlation between
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1Virtually all studies ﬁnd a very high correlation between money growth and inﬂation, so that both
variables can be used to study the superneutrality question. For example, McCandless and Weber [1995]
report a long-run correlation of money growth and consumer-price inﬂation of 0.925 (0.958) for M0 (M1)
in a cross section of 110 countries.
2Temple [2000] contains a survey of recent empirical contributions as well as a discussion of the meth-
odological diﬃculties involved. Summaries of empirical investigations are also given in Ghosh and Phillips
[1998], Bruno and Easterly [1998], Ragan [1998] and Briault [1995].
1monetary variables and economic growth.3 More recently, a consensus seems to have
emerged that inﬂation is detrimental to growth. Evidence of this negative relationship has
been found in a set of studies making use mainly of panel regression models, such as Barro
[1996], Judson and Orphanides [1999], Gylfason and Herbertsson [2001] and Gillman,
Harris and Mátyás [2004].4 Barro [1996], for example, using 10-year averages of data
for over 100 countries spanning the period 1960-1990, ﬁnds that a 10 percentage point
increase in the monetary growth rate decreases economic growth by 0.2-0.3 percentage
points, depending on the monetary variable used.5 Unlike Barro, who cannot reject a
linear inﬂation-growth relationship, most recent studies furthermore ﬁnd evidence of non-
linearity in the data.6
The eﬀects of money on output levels and growth have also been investigated extens-
ively in the theoretical literature. The short-run eﬀects of money on output have been
fruitfully analysed in the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium framework of the New
Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS) business cycle models.7 At the same time, growth theorists
have been interested in understanding the eﬀects of money growth on long-run economic
growth. While this issue has been extensively explored in the exogenous growth framework
of Ramsey [1928] and Solow [1956],8 it was the development of endogenous growth theory
3The cross-country study of McCandless and Weber [1995] is a good example and contains further
references. More recently, Judson and Orphanides [1999] ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relation in cross-country data
but a negative relation when panel data are used. In a time—series setup, Geweke [1986] ﬁnds support for
the superneutrality hypothesis using a century of annual U.S. data.
4In fact, Temple [2000] reports one way of summarizing empirical ﬁndings is that a negative correlation
might be present in panel data but not in cross-country data.
5The growth rates of M1, M2 and a consumer price index are used as explanatory variables.
6Papers investigating the non-linearity of the inﬂation-growth relationship include Sarel [1996], Ghosh
and Phillips [1998], Judson and Orphanides [1999], Gylfason and Herbertsson [2001], Khan and Senhadji
[2001], Gillman, Harris and Mátyás [2004] and Burdekin et al [2004]. In particular, the eﬀect of inﬂation
seems to be negative and insigniﬁcant or even signiﬁcantly positive at low levels of inﬂation, becoming
signiﬁcantly negative once a threshold level has been passed. The threshold is found to be diﬀerent for
industrialized countries, with estimates as low the 1% found by Khan and Senhadji [2001], and developing
countries. Some recent estimates for developing countries are 3% (Burdekin et al [2004]) and 11% (Khan
and Senhadji [2001]). Khan and Senhadji [2001]) emphasise that the theoretical mechanisms underlying
the relationship may be diﬀerent for industrialized and developing countries, too.
7Cf. e.g. to Clarída, Galí and Gertler [1999], Chari, Kehoe and MacGrattan [2000] and Cooley and
Hansen [1995]. Important empirical studies investigating the behaviour of money and output at business
cycle frequencies include Stock and Watson [2000] and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans [2000].
8Seminal contributions include Tobin [1965], Sidrauski [1967], Fischer [1979] and Stockman [1981]. This
literature is surveyed nicely in Orphanides and Solow [1990]. Of course, money growth could inﬂuence
economic growth only on the transition path to steady state equilibrium in these models. Concerning
the steady state, the models investigate the existence of level eﬀects of inﬂation on the capital stock and
output.
2that recently sparked renewed interest in the relationship between inﬂation and growth.
Recent papers investigate diﬀerent channels through which inﬂation can aﬀect the accu-
mulation of (physical or human) capital which is the engine of growth. One strand of the
literature assumes that the marginal productivity of investment is aﬀected by inﬂation,
thereby inﬂuencing investment and growth. The main mechanism investigated by a num-
ber of studies, including Gomme [1993], Jones and Manuelli [1995], Fukuda [1996], Itaya
and Mino [2003], Gillman, Harris and Mátyás [2004] and Gillman and Kejak [2005], is
the inﬂation tax on labour supply: If money needs to be held to buy goods, consumption
gets more expensive relative to leisure as inﬂation rises.9 The reduction of labour supply
resulting from substitution can aﬀect growth negatively if the marginal product of physical
or human capital depends on employment.10 In other models, the marginal product of
capital is aﬀected by the reallocation of productive resources within the economy: When
a credit sector is explicitly modelled and credit is a substitute for money in transactions,
inﬂation leads to the reallocation of resources away from productive uses to this ﬁnancial
sector.11 Another strand of the literature assumes that the marginal productivity of cap-
ital is unchanged by inﬂation, yet the eﬀective return to investment is aﬀected by inﬂation.
In this spirit, Chari, Jones and Manuelli [1996] and Jones and Manuelli [1995] investig-
ate the consequences of a non-indexed tax system with nominal depreciation allowances.
By raising the nominal interest rate, inﬂation reduces the present value of depreciation
allowances, raising the eﬀective tax rate and reducing the after tax return on investment.
Similarly, they show that cash reserve requirements on bank deposits which banks use to
give investment loans reduce the return on investment with increasing inﬂation. Thus, a
9Money demand is introduced via a cash-in-advance constraint on (all or a subset of) consumption
goods in most of the cited papers. Alternatively, Wang and Yip [1992] augment a Lucas [1988]-type model
assuming real cash balances are an input to output production, and ﬁnd that money is superneutral.
Chang [2002] extends this model by assuming that money is productive in human capital accumulation,
too. He ﬁnds that when inﬂation is positive, ﬁrms economise on real cash holdings, which reduces the rate
of human capital accumulation and hence, growth.
10This is most straightforward in the setup of Jones and Manuelli [1995], where the output production
function is y = k
α(hn)
1−α,w h e r en is employment and h is human capital which can be accumulated using
output. A given stock of capital k/h (which is unaﬀected by inﬂation given that the depreciation rates of
h and k are identical) is used more intensively when employment increases, raising the marginal product
of capital. Fukuda [1996] and Itaya and Mino [2003] ﬁnd that under certain transaction technologies and
parameter constellations, the eﬀect of decreased labour supply can be to increase equilibrium employment
and growth when production has increasing returns due to labour externalities, such that the slope of the
labour demand curve is positive and bigger than that of labour supply.
11This eﬀect is detrimental to growth in Marquis and Reﬀett [1994] but weakens the negative eﬀect of
inﬂation on growth in Gillman, Harris and Mátyás [2004] and Gillman and Kejak [2005] as in the latter
two papers, the increasing use of credit reduces the substitution of leisure for consumption. Cf. to Temple
[2000] for references on the interaction of inﬂation, the ﬁnancial sector and growth.
3negative eﬀect of inﬂation on growth is established in a variety of frameworks.
The present paper contributes to the literature on inﬂation and endogenous growth.
There are to our knowledge no papers investigating the inﬂuence of price rigidities and
inﬂa t i o no ng r o w t hw h e nt h el a t t e ri sf u e l l e dby productivity gains achieved through
research and development. As innovations are probably a more important source of long-
term growth than is capital accumulation, we think it is important to understand the
potential eﬀects of monetary policy on the incentive to engage in research activities and
hence, on economic growth. We therefore discuss the superneutrality issue in the ‘Quality
Ladder’ model developed by Aghion and Howitt [1992] and Grossman and Helpman [1991].
Monopolistically competitive ﬁrms produce imperfectly substitutable intermediate goods
of diﬀerent qualities which are combined into the aggregate good in the competitive output
sector. Eﬀorts of the research and development sector lead to new designs for improved
intermediate goods which then replace existing intermediate goods. To be able to discuss
the real eﬀects of nominal variables, we introduce money into the model via the standard
assumption that households derive utility from holding real balances, as ﬁrst introduced
by Sidrauski [1967]. Following the standard procedure in both the NNS literature and
parts of the literature dealing with the growth eﬀects of inﬂation,12 we further add price
rigidity to the model. New ﬁrms entering the intermediate goods market with an improved
good set a price which is ﬁxed thereafter. Thus, the timing of price changes is determined
endogenously in a natural way. To be able to investigate the comparative static properties
of the model with respect to price rigidity, we further allow existing ﬁrms to change their
prices infrequently, where price readjustment follows the standard timing structure of
Calvo [1983] and Kimball [1995].13
In this framework, we ﬁrst show that money has no real eﬀects when prices are per-
fectly ﬂexible. With price rigidity, we ﬁnd that money growth inﬂuences real activity
through various channels. In the unique steady state equilibrium, we identify two clear-
cut countervailing eﬀects of inﬂation on growth. First, the negative past relative price
eﬀect: The rigidity-induced dispersion of prices currently charged by intermediate goods
producers biases the output sector’s demand towards intermediate goods with old prices,
leading to ineﬃcient production of output. The resulting decrease in the equilibrium size
of the output sector reduces demand for new intermediate goods. Through this channel
of aggregate price distortion, money growth lowers the incentive to innovate and there-
fore, economic growth. Second, there is a positive future relative price eﬀect: The erosion
of the ﬁrm’s relative price will lead to growing demand for the intermediate good while
12Cf. e.g. Maussner [2004].
13Kimball’s model is a variation of Calvo’s model. In his version, ﬁrms are assumed to set prices so as
to maximize the present value of proﬁts, instead of following a rule of thumb as modelled by Calvo.
4its own price will be ﬁxed. This entails higher proﬁts, raising the value of a patent and
therefore fuelling economic growth. The two eﬀects are highly intuitive and always have
opposite signs. Calibrating the model with standard values from the literature, we ﬁnd
that in numerical examples, the former eﬀect dominates such that money growth reduces
economic growth. Both eﬀects are of a sizeable dimension individually, while the net eﬀect
on growth is in line with the ﬁndings of parts of the above-cited empirical literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model. Section
3 presents the steady state equilibrium the comparative static properties of which are
discussed in section 4. In section 5 we calibrate the model and in 6, some preliminary
results about local stabilityare presented. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
The New Neoclassical synthesis introduces Keynesian elements such as price rigidity into
the standard Real Business Cycle model. In the same spirit, we introduce Keynesian fea-
tures into the standard Schumpeterian growth model to analyse the relationship between
inﬂation and long-run growth. The introduction of price rigidity has an impact on the
optimal behaviour of nearly all sectors. To still facilitate comparison to both NNS models
and growth models with endogenous technological change, we use the most standard spe-
ciﬁcation of both building blocks available. The speciﬁcation of the real side of our model
is closest to Barro/Sala-i-Martin [2003] (henceforth: BS). Concerning the modelling of
price rigidity, the frequency of price readjustment is partly endogenized in a natural way,
while the underlying structure of pricing signals follows the standard Calvo [1983]-Kimball
[1995 speciﬁcation. We analyse Rational Expectations Equilibria in this model, where we
restrict our attention to steady state equilibria with constant output growth.
Sketch of the Model In our model, as in the the recent NNS literature, intermediate
goods are the only input in the production of the ﬁnal good,14 while labour is used in the
production of intermediate goods and in research. Therefore, we ﬁrst present optimal de-
cisions as a function of the size of the output sector and then use labour market equilibrium
to determine this variable.15 More precisely, we ﬁr s td e r i v et h eﬁnal good sector’s optimal
demand for goods from the intermediate goods sector and the latter sector’s optimal prices
and resulting labour demand in a monopolistically competitive environment under price
14Cf. e.g. the models of Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan [2000], Kim [2000], Yun [1996] and Erceg,
Henderson and Levin [2000]
15In this respect our model diﬀers from BS, where all relevant variables depend directly on aggregate
labour L as labour is only used in the production of the ﬁnal good. Therefore, our steps in solving the
model diﬀer somewhat from theirs.
5rigidity. By further calculating the market value of a new intermediate good producer
at the time of his market entry, we get the price for a patent from the research sector.
Free entry implies expected proﬁt from research must be zero. Using the information
about the patent price, the zero proﬁt condition gives us the optimal research intensity
µ as a function of the size of the output sector. Using optimal labour demands, we then
determine the size of the output sector compatible with labour market equilibrium. With
this information, production side equilibrium gives us the optimal research intensity as a
function of L and other variables ﬁrms take as given. Analysis of the public sector that
controls the money supply, of the bond market and of the optimal behaviour of house-
holds, which hold utility-yielding real balances, yields the remaining conditions necessary
to discuss the general equilibrium.
2.1 Final good sector
A perfectly competitive ﬁnal goods sector assembles the economy’s ﬁnal output good
















where where xkj is the amount of sector j type kj intermediate good used, and qkj is this
type’s productivity. We assume that the elasticity of substitution between intermediate
goods α is larger than unity. The constant-elasticity-of-substitution form of the aggregator
follows Dixit and Stiglitz [1977]. The sector’s proﬁts are given by




where P(τ) is the current price for output and Pkj(τ) is the price charged for one unit of
type kj sector j intermediate good. Cost minimization leads to ﬁrms’ optimal demand for
intermediate goods, which depends negatively on the type’s relative price and the elasticity
of substitution between productivity-adjusted intermediate goods, α, and positively on its







Perfect competition prevents ﬁrms from making positive proﬁts. Optimal demand for
intermediate goods and the zero proﬁt condition determine the output price16















For later use, we deﬁne the economy’s aggregate technology index, Q(τ), as the weighted












2.2 Intermediate goods sector
There is a number N of intermediate goods, with N going to inﬁnity. Each intermediate
good is produced by one ﬁrm that bought the blueprint from the corresponding research
ﬁrms. Good kj is produced using a linear technology with labour as the only input:
xkj(τ)=Lkj(τ) (6)
2.2.1 An intermediate good producer’s pricing problem
The instantaneous proﬁto faﬁrm producing type kj consists of the diﬀerence between
its price Pkj and marginal costs, given by the wage rate w(τ) determined in the perfectly






As intermediate goods are imperfect substitutes in the output production function, in-
termediate goods producers act in an environment of monopolistic competition and can
choose an optimal price subject to the output producing sector’s demand function.
We assume the existence of nominal rigidities in the intermediate goods markets: Pro-
ducers can only adjust their prices infrequently. The standard assumption in the literature
due to Calvo [1983] and Kimball [1995] is that at each point in time, with an exogenous
ﬂow probability β ﬁrms receive a signal allowing them to readjust their prices, where the
signal is generated by a stochastic Poisson process with parameter β. In our model, a ﬁrm
entering the market with an innovative intermediate good naturally choose a price for the
new product. As the probability of new inventions being made in the research sector is
governed by a Poisson process with endogenously determined parameter µ,t h i sd o e sn o t
change the basic structure of pricing signals received by ﬁrms as modelled in the literature
while determining the parameter endogenously in a natural way. To be able to conduct
comparative static experiments with regard to price rigidity, we further allow existing ﬁrms
to readjust their prices infrequently, making use of the Calvo-Kimball structure.
7Firms thus solve an intertemporal problem to maximise proﬁts: Knowing they will not
be able to readjust their prices for some time, they choose an optimal price Pkj(τ
¯ ¯tkj = τ )
to maximise the present value at the time of market entrance tkj of their future nominal





¯ ¯tkj = τ )
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.P r o ﬁts
of all future periods s are weighted with the probability that the ﬁrm has not been replaced
by a successor and has not received a signal allowing to readjust prices as of time s.
This leads to a discount factor given by the sum of the nominal interest rate, i,t h eﬂow
probability of being replaced by another ﬁrm, µkj (τ) and the ﬂow probability of receiving
a reset signal for the price, β.17 In steady state equilibrium, the replacement probability













Pkj (τ) − w(s)
¤
xkj(s)ds (7)
where the constant e B is part of the probability distribution of the pricing signal. Maxim-
ising the value given in (7) with respect to the price Pkj(τ
¯ ¯tkj = τ ) subject to the output
producing ﬁrm’s demand function (3) leads to the following expression for the optimal
price at time tkj when good kj is invented:
Pkj(τ












w h e r ew er e n a m et h ec h o s e np r i c ea sP∗ (τ) to indicate that the price is optimal for
any ﬁrm j choosing a price at time τ, regardless of whether the ﬁrm ﬁrst enters the
market or has received a reset signal for its price and regardless of their position on
the quality ladder, qkj. Intuitively, the optimal price is forward-looking: The numerator
takes account of the future development of cost, with w(s) being marginal cost at time s.
Analogously, the denominator reﬂects the future development of demand for the good. As
in the standard case without rigidities, the mark-up α
α−1 reﬂects the degree of monopoly
power and decreases in the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods, α.





i + µ + β − απ − γ
i + µ + β − απ − γ − ω
w(τ) (9)
17While the parameter β is constant by deﬁnition, the interest rate i is constant at steady state. The
exact form of the discount factor is derived in Appendix 2.
18Convergence of the integral requires i+µ+β −απ −γ −ω>0. A detailed derivation can be found in
appendix 3. We assume here that only the latest quality is available in each sector. At steady state, this
8In a world without rigidities, a monopolistically competitive ﬁrm would optimally charge a
price Pkj(τ)= α
α−1w(τ), where the elasticity of substitution between the imperfectly sub-
stitutable goods α determines the markup over marginal cost. In the presence of nominal
rigidities, the intermediate goods producers thus choose a higher markup if marginal cost
increases over time (ω>0).19 This is because during intervals of ﬁxed prices, the price-cost
ratio erodes at rate ω. The additional markup term (i + µ + β − απ − γ)/(i + µ + β − απ − γ − ω)
increases in the growth rate of marginal cost, ω. As shown in Appendix 7, in the steady
state equilibrium the growth rate of the wage ω equals the growth rate of money supply, ψ.
The markup therefore increases with money growth. Further, the present value of a given
stream of future proﬁts decreases with the interest rate i, while the probability of obsoles-
cence µ and the ﬂow probability of receiving a reset signal for the price reduce the probabil-
ity of obtaining these proﬁts (while the current price is valid). Thus, the importance of fu-
ture proﬁts in the ﬁrm’s optimization is reduced, the higher i, µ and β.20 Consequently, the
bigger these variables, the closer is the chosen price to the optimal price without rigidity,
i.e. the smaller the additional markup (i + µ + β − απ − γ)/(i + µ + β − απ − γ − ω).
On the other hand, future demand increases in απ + γ so the size of potential future
proﬁts relative to current proﬁts increases in these variables. Thus the higher inﬂation π
and output growth γ, the bigger the term (i + µ + β − απ − γ)/(i + µ + β − απ − γ − ω).
By choosing a higher mark-up, the ﬁrm reduces the deviation from optimal price in future
periods, which are associated with high demand.
Equilibrium in the market for intermediate goods Supply in the market for in-
termediate goods equals demand as production of each good j is determined by the ﬁnal
good sectors’s demand function for good j given in equation (3).
2.2.2 An intermediate good producer’s market value at market entrance




¯ ¯tkj = τ
¢
of the ﬁrm using the patent. We calculate this market value given by
the present value at market entrance in tkj of all future proﬁts of the ﬁrm, taking into
account stationary growth of Y , P and w, the probability of obsolescence before time s,





(α−1). If this is not the case, monopoly pricing by new ﬁrms





with ε arbitrarily small, thereby attracting all demand for sector j intermediate goods while making non-
negative proﬁts. Limit pricing would then obtain. So far, we have only analysed limit pricing for the
limiting case β =0 , where results were qualitatively equivalent to the case with monopoly pricing.






20Note that a higher value of β corresponds to a lower level of price rigidity.
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where χ = i+µ−απ−γ. In any future period s>τw h e r ei ti ss t i l la c t i v e ,t h eﬁrm’s price








. If at least one signal has been received, Pj (s) is equal
to P∗ (θ) where θ is the last period where a reset signal was received. θ c a nt a k eo na n y
value between τ and s, weighted with the corresponding probability βe−β(s−θ).U s i n gt h i s ,







































where A(τ)=qkj(α−1)Y (τ)P (τ)





















χ − (1 − α)ω
¸
1
χ − ω + β
(12)
The ﬁrm’s market value can be interpreted as the present value of an inﬁnite stream of
proﬁts. Remember that the present value at time τ of a an inﬁnite stream of steadily
growing proﬁts starting at τ is Π(τ)/(R − x),w h e r eΠ(τ) is instantaneous proﬁta t
τ, x is the proﬁtg r o w t hr a t ea n dR is the constant interest rate. Note that in our
case instantaneous proﬁt is proportional to the sector’s position on the quality ladder
£
qkj/Q(τ)
¤α−1 and the size of the output sector Y (τ)/Q(τ) as demand for the good
increases in both variables. The corresponding discount rate for the inﬁnite stream of
proﬁts consists of several parts given in the last two terms of (12). Remembering that
χ = i + µ − απ − γ, the obsolescence-adjusted interest rate, i + µ,f e a t u r e si na l lp a r t so f
the discount rate. Furthermore, as described above, the growth rate of proﬁts has to be
subtracted from the interest rate. As prices can only be changed infrequently, the growth
rate of proﬁts is diﬀerent in periods where prices can be changed than in periods where
prices are ﬁxed. This explains the composite form of the discount factor: The term to the
very right is applicable to intervals where prices are ﬁxed: Demand grows at rate απ + γ
as the ﬁrm’s relative price erodes at rate απ while prices are ﬁxed and output growth is
21Derivation of the market value is described in more detail in Appendix 2.
10γ.22 Unit cost grows at rate ω, leading to the discount rate i + µ + β − (απ + γ + ω) for
proﬁts.23 T h ed i s c o u n tr a t ef o rp r o ﬁts in intervals with ﬁxed prices increases in β as the
duration of these intervals decreases in the probability of receiving a reset signal for the
price. The term 1+β/{i + µ − [απ + γ +( 1− α)ω]} applies to periods where prices can
be changed so both revenue and costs grow at the desired rate απ + γ +( 1− α)ω.T h e
higher β, the higher the number of periods (in addition to the period of market entrance)
where this applies.
2.2.3 The Intermediate Goods sector’s labour demand
We next derive the sector’s labour demand which will later be used to determine the size of
the output sector compatible with labour market equilibrium. Due to the linear production
function (6), ﬁrm kj’s labour demand is equal to the output producing sector’s demand
for the ﬁrm’s good. This is found by plugging the optimal price into the demand function,














Obviously, aggregate demand for intermediate goods depends negatively on the average
relative price of intermediate goods relative to technology. This average price eﬀective at
time τ can be expressed as a weighted average of past optimal prices, where the weights










More speciﬁcally, the weights reﬂect the probability that a pricing signal was received or
an innovation made at time s, (µ + β) and that no such event took place between times s
and τ, e(µ+β)(s−τ). Thus, we have f (s,τ)=( µ + β)e(µ+β)(s−τ). Using this and evaluating














22Cf. to equation (3) to see that demand growth is proportional to the growth of output and the erosion
of relative price.
23The term i + µ + β − (απ + γ + ω) represents the discount rate for the ﬁrm’s costs as these have
the growth rate απ + γ + ω. Revenue actually grows at rate απ + γ so i + µ + β − (απ + γ) would be




present value of revenue multiplicatively. As this optimal price takes account of the diﬀerence between
revenue growth and the growth rate of costs, the term i + µ + β − (απ + γ) cancels out and the discount
rate i + µ + β − (απ + γ + ω) applies to both revenues and costs.
24A more detailed derivation can be found in Appendix 5.
11If prices could be reset each period, all ﬁrms would charge today’s optimal price relative





α represents the rigidity-
caused deviation of the average relative price from today’s optimal relative price. The
rigidity-caused expression decreases in β and µ,r e ﬂecting the fact that the smaller µ and
β, the higher the probability that prices were set long ago and the smaller the average price.
Thus a higher degree of price rigidity (lower β) leads to higher demand for intermediate
goods because they are cheaper on average. Further, as the average price decreases in the
wage growth rate ω, demand increases with ω: The higher the growth rate of wages, the
faster the change in the optimal price chosen by ﬁrms and thus the cheaper are goods
with old prices compared to goods with new prices, i.e. the more eﬀective is a given level
of price rigidity.25 As will be shown in section 3.1.1, the wage growth rate ω equals the
rate of money growth ψ.T h u sw eh a v eh e r eo n eo ft h em e c h a n i s m st h r o u g hw h i c hm o n e y
inﬂuences the real side of the economy: Total demand for intermediate goods increases with
ψ because given rigidity, money growth reduces the average relative price. The mechanism
w i l lb ed i s c u s s e di nm o r ed e t a i li nt h es e c t i on concerned with comparative statics, 4.
2.3 Patents and the R&D sector
In the research and development sector, there are N small research ﬁrms, each trying to
improve the quality of one existing intermediate good. The ﬂow probability of an invention
being made is governed by a Poisson process with parameter µkj (τ) for the ﬁrm trying to
improve intermediate good kj. For a given quality rung kj (i.e., current position of sector





For any given level of research, the probability of success decreases in the number of
innovations that have already been made in that particular sector. This idea is captured
by assuming φ0(kj(τ)) < 0. In case of success for research ﬁrm j, the design of the new,
improved good will be sold to a new ﬁrm that will enter the market for intermediate
goods, replacing the incumbent in sector j. Given that positive proﬁts are made in the
intermediate goods sector, there will be competition for the patent of the new product.
Potential ﬁrms will bid up the price such that the research ﬁrm is able to extract the
intermediate good producer’s entire proﬁt. A potential producer’s maximum willingness
to pay is the present value of all future proﬁts at market entrance E
£
Vkj+1 (τ)
¯ ¯tkj = τ
¤
,
a sg i v e ni ne q u a t i o n( 1 2 ) . G i v e nt h a tr e s e a r c hﬁrms charge exactly this price, all new
25The wage growth rate enters the rigidity term in the form with factor −α because the optimal price
to the power of −α, which is the relevant variable for demand, grows at this rate.
12patents will be bought and the market for patents clears.









There is free entry into the research sector, so ﬁrms’ expected proﬁti sz e r oa te v e r yi n s t a n t
which using (15) implies that either no research is undertaken (LR




¯ ¯tkj = τ
¤
− w(τ)=0 (16)
holds. Thus, zero proﬁt implies that expected proﬁt from research per researcher equal
the wage.
For any given research eﬀort, the probability of making an innovation decreases in the
sector’s position on the quality ladder. We choose a speciﬁcation for φ(kj(τ)) that implies
the existence of spillovers in research: The lower the sector’s quality level in comparison to
aggregate quality, i.e. the further away the sector is from the research frontier, the easier
is making an innovation:








where 1/λ is the productivity of labour in research. As will become obvious, the speciﬁc-
a t i o ni sc h o s e ns u c ha st oe x a c t l yo ﬀset the positive eﬀect of a sector’s position on the
quality ladder on expected proﬁt, which is due to positive dependence of the expected
market value of the ﬁrm using the new patent on its quality. As is a strong but standard
assumption in the literature to make sure that the optimal research intensity µ can be
constant and independent of a sector’s position.
2.3.1 The Research sector’s labour demand
Research ﬁrm kj’s labour demand is found by rearranging (15) and plugging in φ(kj(τ))






















2.3.2 Behaviour of the aggregate quality index Q(τ) and the growth rate
The innovations made in the R&D sector determine the evolution of the quality index
deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 5 ) .I nc a s eo fa ni n n o v a t i o no c c u r r i n gi ns e c t o rj, the sector’s qual-
ity increases from qkj(τ) to qkj(τ)+1. At the same time, the sector’s contribution to the
13aggregate quality index rises from q(α−1)kj(τ) to q(α−1)[kj(τ)+1]. Assuming again that the
ﬂow probability of an innovation occurring, µ, is constant and equal across sectors, the












The expected growth rate of the quality index (5) can then be calculated from the sum
of these contributions. The Law of large numbers further implies that for a large number










It will be shown in section (2.4) that at steady state, the growth rate of output γ equals





2.4 Labour market equilibrium
The variables determining the model’s production side equilibrium, most notably expected
proﬁt in the research sector, depend on the size of the output sector. Using equilibrium
in the labour market we now pin down this variable as a function of endogenous variables
and employment L, as in Sala-i-Martin [2003] and then proceed to the production side
equilibrium.
Equilibrium in the labour market requires that the sum of the labour demands of the
intermediate goods sector, LX (τ), and of the research sector, LR, equal labour supply L:
L = LX + LR (22)
Plugging in the labour demands from the intermediate goods sector, (14), and the research
















As discussed in section 2.2.3, demand for intermediate goods increases in the rigidity-
caused term
µ+β








decreases in this term. Thus, the size of the output sector
Y (τ)
Q(τ) compatible with labour
market equilibrium decreases in the level of rigidity β for given µ and a given size of the
labour force L.
26A detailed derivation can be found in Appendix 6.
27Note that from Appendix 7,
P∗(τ)
P(τ)Q(τ) is constant. Hence, we have that for constant µ,
Y (τ)
Q(τ) is constant
and γ = γQ at steady state, as asserted above.
142.5 Production side equilibrium
Plugging φ(kj(τ)) from equation (17) and a new ﬁrm’s expected market value E
¡
Vkj+1 (τ)
¯ ¯tkj = τ
¢










χ + β − (1 − α)ω
χ − (1 − α)ω
1
χ + β − ω
= w(τ)
with χ = i + µ − απ − γ, which determines the research intensity µ which makes current
research ﬁrms indiﬀerent with regard to the amount of research labour used.28 As can
be seen, the resulting research intensity is the same for all ﬁrms making an innovation at
time τ, regardless of the sector’s current position on the quality ladder, consistent with
our assumption in section 2.2. The research intensity µ depends on the size of the ﬁnal
good sector,
Y (τ)
Q(τ), which we have determined in the equation describing labour market
equilibrium, (23). Replacing
Y (τ)
Q(τ) with this value and rearranging gives us the zero proﬁt







i + µ + β − [απ + γ +( 1− α)ω]
i + µ − [απ + γ +( 1− α)ω]
[i + µ + β − (απ + γ + ω)]
−1 =1 (24)
2.6 Public Sector
The public sector is modelled as in earlier monetary growth models choosing the most
parsimonious speciﬁcation: The state expands the money supply at a constant rate ψ and
distributes seigniorage to the households in form of a lump-sum transfer.29 In particular,
the independent central bank perfectly controls the money supply, Ms(τ), by setting the





This simple money supply rule is suﬃcient for our purposes because we are not concerned
with either the replication of actual data of central bank behaviour or the design of optimal
monetary policy.




The state does not levy taxes and there is no government spending apart from the transfer
of seigniorage to households.
28Note that the ﬁrm’s value is E

Vkj+1 (τ)
 tkj = τ

because it will produce the next quality, kj +1for
the sector, which is about to be developed.
29Cf. to e.g. Gillman and Kejak [2005], Chang [2002], Marquis and Reﬀett [1995], Orphanides and Solow
[1990].
152.7 Bond market
There is a positive number of investment funds in the economy which ﬁnance research
activities. Each fund is of suﬃcient size to diversify the risk associated with its investments,
such that they only care about the expected proﬁt of each investment.30 Funds issue a total
of B(τ) bonds which can be bought by households at price PB(τ). Given the existence
of a risk-free nominal interest rate i(τ), no-arbitrage implies that the proﬁt a bond yields














At each moment, a number
·





In return, all returns from selling patents resulting from successful research are allocated
to the investment funds. Interest payments sum up to equal these revenues such that
investment funds make zero proﬁts.
Equilibrium in the bonds market requires the number of outstanding bonds Bs (τ) to
be equal to the number of bonds Bd (τ) households wish to hold at price PB(τ):
Bs (τ)=Bd (τ)
2.8 Households
There is a continuum of households with mass one distributed uniformly on the interval
[0,1]. This allows us to interpret aggregate quantities as per capita quantities associated
with the decisions of a representative household. The inﬁnitely lived representative house-
hold is assumed to maximise the present value of utility over his lifetime, where future
ﬂows of instantaneous utility are discounted with the factor ρ>0. The household needs
money for transaction purposes. Instead of modelling the transactions services of money
explicitly or introducing a cash-in-advance-constraint we adopt the widespread shortcut-
assumption that households derive utility from holding real balances m = M
P .31 Letting
30At the same time, funds are not big enough to internalize existing distortions.
31Feenstra [1986] shows that our case of non-separable utility for consumption and real balances is
equivalent to the explicit modelling of cash holdings’ transaction cost reducing function, which is the
standard justiﬁcation for choosing this shortcut. This representation is used in many monetary Dynamic
General Equilibrium models, such as Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan [2000], Kim [2000], Erceg, Henderson
and Levin [2000].
16c denote per capita consumption of the ﬁnal good and assuming the rate of population







w h e r ew ea s s u m eη>0, θ ∈ [0,1). The representative household maximises (28) subject to
his budget constraint. He inelastically supplies L units of labour at the wage rate w(τ),32
receives a transfer T(τ) from the government and has an interest income of iBonds(τ)B(τ)
from his bond holdings, where iBonds(τ) is given in (27). Income is used for consumption
c(τ) at price P(τ), the acquisition of new bonds
·

















+ rv(τ) − c(τ) − [π + r]m(τ) (30)
where m(τ)=
M(τ)
P(τ) are the household’s real money holdings, r is the real interest rate, π
is inﬂation and v(τ) is the household’s real wealth, with v(τ)=m(τ)+
PB(τ)B(τ)
P(τ) .34 The





= r + π (31)
and








= r − ρ (32)
Equation (31) is the familiar static eﬃciency requirement that in equilibrium the ratio
of consumed goods’ marginal utilities equal their cost ratio. The opportunity cost of
money is shown to be equal to the sum of real interest rate r and inﬂation rate π,i . e .t h e
nominal interest rate.36 The dynamic eﬃciency condition (32) is the standard version of the
Keynes-Ramsey-Rule with money.37 As usual, consumption growth depends positively on
the diﬀerence between the real interest rate and the household’s rate of time preference. In
32Endogenising labour supply by introducing labour into the utility function such that the consump-
tion/leisure decision is not separable from the decision about real balances would of course add another
channel through which money could have real eﬀects, c.f. e.g. Walsh [2003], p. 66.
33
·
B (τ) is the change in the number of bonds held by the household.
34For a detailed derivation see Appendix 8.
35For a detailed derivation see Appendix 9.
36In our perfect-foresight model, there is no need to distinguish between expected and actual inﬂation,
such that i = r + π.
37Cf., for example, Maussner [1994], p.177.
17addition, it also depends positively (negatively) on the growth rate of real money balances
if ucm > 0 (ucm < 0)w h e r eu =
(c(s)1−θm(s)θ)1−η−1
1−η is the household’s instantaneous utility
function.38
Since real interest rate r and inﬂation π are constant at steady state, equation (31)
implies that the ratio of consumption to real balances held is constant. Thus, the growth
rates of consumption and real balances must be equal. Using this in (32) gives the familiar












We will ﬁrst use households’ optimal behaviour and information from the public sector to
determine equilibrium in the money market. We then introduce the compiled information
into the production side equilibrium to analyse the model’s general equilibrium.
3.1 Closing the model
3.1.1 Money market equilibrium
In the money market, money demand must equal supply, Ms(τ)=Md(τ) or given the
initial money stock owned by households M (0), the growth rate of real money supply, ψ−
π,39 must equal the growth rate of demand for real balances
·
md(τ)
md(τ). From the household’s










c(τ) = γ,w h e r eγ is the steady state growth rate of output.
Thus, equilibrium in the money market is characterised by ψ − π = γ or
π = ψ − γ (35)
that is, the inﬂation rate at steady state equals the diﬀerence between the money growth
rate and the economy’s output growth rate.
38ucm = θ(1 − η)(1− θ)c
−[η+θ(1−η)]m
θ(1−η)−1.




40Cf. to the household’s static optimality condition (31).
18In Appendix 7 it is shown that the wage w(τ) grows at rate γ +π. Using (35) we thus
have that the growth rate of marginal cost equals the growth rate of money supply:
ψ = γ + π = ω (36)
3.1.2 Research intensity in General Equilibrium
Using equilibrium in the money market (35), the equality of wage growth and money










r + µ +( α − 2)γ
¸
[r + µ + β − 2γ − α(ψ − γ)]
−1 =1
Expected proﬁt from research per invested Euro is given on the LHS of equation (24) and
must equal the cost of investment (1 Euro) given on the RHS of the Equation. Expected
proﬁt is proportional to a new ﬁrm’s value, which in line with the discussion in section
















[r + µ + β − (α(ψ − γ) − 2γ)] represents the compound discount rate
for the ﬁrm’s future proﬁts.41 Rearranging, we have that the new ﬁrm’s instantaneous











r + µ +( α − 2)γ
¸−1
[r + µ + β − 2γ − α(ψ − γ)] (37)
The two sides of equation (37) reﬂect the dependence of the optimal research intensity µ
on the new ﬁrm’s value. The LHS of equation (37) represents the ﬁrm’s instantaneous













proportional to total demand for the ﬁrm’s good.42
Further using the Euler equation (33) and the equation relating economic growth to




















ρ + β − αψ +
µ







41The discount factor consists of several parts because the ﬁrm’s proﬁtg r o w t hr a t ei sd i ﬀerent in periods
with ﬁxed prices than when prices can be changed. Cf. to section 2.2.2 for details.















.T h et e r m
[P
∗(τ)/(P(τ)Q(τ))]
−α cancels out, however, because the present value of the ﬁrm decreases in its chosen
relative price relative to technology, [P
∗(τ)/(P(τ)Q(τ))]
α. Intuitively, relative price increases desired by





Figure 1: Equilibrium research intensity µ
3.2 Existence and uniqueness of the steady state equilibrium
In this section we show that for suﬃciently small frictions (large β) the economy has a
unique steady state.43 To do so, we ﬁrst note that the RHS of equation (37) monotonously
increases in µ. Second we will show that the LHS of the equation is concave in µ as depicted
in ﬁgure 1 and for suﬃciently large β has a bigger vertical intercept than the LHS-curve.
Under this condition the economy has a unique steady state.
The RHS of equation (37) consists of the compound discount rate for the ﬁrm’s proﬁts.
The higher the future research intensity µ, the higher the probability that the new ﬁrm
will quickly be replaced by a successor and thus the lower the probability that the ﬁrm will
be active and accumulate proﬁts in the future. This leads to an increase in the discount
rate for future proﬁts, reducing the present value of a given stream of proﬁts. Therefore,
the RHS of equation (37) increases in µ.44
The LHS of equation (37) reﬂects a new ﬁrm’s instantaneous proﬁt which is propor-
tional to the size of the output sector. The LHS is not monotonous in µ because there
are several oﬀsetting eﬀects. First of all, the current level of µ has a negative eﬀect on
expected proﬁt and thus the on LHS of equation (37) because an increase in µ raises de-
mand for research labour µ
qα−1
α−1 (‘investment’), which given the size of the labour force is
only compatible with labour market equilibrium for a smaller size of the output market
(‘consumption’). As demand for the new intermediate good is proportional to the size of
43If β is too small, at most two steady states exist. The additional steady state is a by-product of
excessive price stickiness. In our numerical calibrations condition 39 was compatible with our choices of
β based on empirical considerations, i.e. values of β violating 39 lead to levels of prices rigidity exceeding
empirically observed durations.
44When no rigidities are present in the model (β = ∞), the increase is linear in µ,o t h e r w i s ei ti s
non-linear. In ﬁgures 2 and 2, the latter case is depicted.
20the output sector,45 it thus decreases in µ, causing proﬁts to drop. This eﬀect is reﬂected
in curve 1 in ﬁgure 2. At the same time, in the presence of price rigidity (β<∞), the past
level of µ has a positive eﬀect on the size of the output sector because it reduces the distor-
tion of demand caused by price rigidity reﬂected in the term [(µ + β)/(µ + β − αψ)]
−1:46
For a given value of β, prices in the intermediate goods sector are changed the more often,
the more innovations occur, and thus the higher µ. Thus, aggregate price rigidity de-
creases in the past level of µ while the size of Y (τ)/Q(τ) increases in the past level of µ.
Graphically, the term [(µ + β)/(µ + β − αψ)]
−1 pulls down curve 1, with the LHS-curve
representing the product of the two eﬀects. It is unclear which of the eﬀects dominates,
b u tt h ep o s i t i v ee ﬀect is the smaller, the higher β.47 This is intuitive: A small value of β
implies a high degree of nominal rigidity (prices cannot be changed very often), entailing a
very strong distortion of demand. Accordingly, relaxing the degree of rigidity by increasing
µ has a strong positive eﬀect on a new ﬁrm’s value. When β is big, prices are not very
sticky. Therefore, relaxing the rigidity by increasing µ has got only a small positive eﬀect
on the ﬁrm’s value compared to the negative eﬀect of the increase in research labour. For
β →∞ , rigidity disappears and the LHS monotonously decreases in µ.I n ﬁgure 2, the







For our purposes, it is suﬃcient that the LHS of equation (37) is strictly concave in µ for
45Cf. equation (3).
46The eﬀect was ﬁrst discussed in section 2.2.3 and will be analysed in more detail in section 4 where we





















































ρ + e ηµ
¸−1
[ρ + β − αψ + e ηµ]
where e η =
³
1+( η + α − 2) α−1
qα−1−1
´
. Under these conditions, existence and uniqueness of
the steady state equilibrium are ensured.50
4 Comparative statics
The comparative static properties of the steady state equilibrium will be analysed using the

















[r + µ + β − 2γ − α(ψ − γ)].
Economy without price rigidity: Superneutrality of money F i r s tn o t et h a tf o r






= r + µ +( α − 2)γ (41)
which corresponds exactly to the case without money. All comparative static properties
are those of the model without money. In particular, the research intensity is unaltered by
both the level and growth rate of money supply. By equation (21) the economy’s growth
rate γ is proportional to research intensity µ. Hence, the growth rate of the economy
is unaﬀected by monetary variables, too: In the quality ladder model with money in the

















< 0 for ψ>0.
For ψ =0 ,
∂LHS
∂µ < 0 and
∂2LHS
∂µ2 =0Together with the condition (40) this is suﬃcient for the existence
of a unique steady state in the case ψ =0 ,t o o .
49Equation (39) implies that a given level of rigidity β e n t a i l sa nu p p e rb o u n do nt h eg r o w t hr a t eo f
money supply ψ compatible with steady state equilibrium. The existence of an upper bound on money
growth is not special to our model but applies to all standard NNS models as already acknowledged by,
e.g. Ascari [2004] and King and Wolman [1996]. A condition similar to 40 is familiar from all speciﬁcations
of the underlying real growth model, cf. e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin [2003].










Figure 3: Comparative statics for β<∞: money growth rate
Economy with price rigidity: Two countervailing eﬀects of money growth We
now use equation (37) to discuss in detail the comparative static properties of the steady
state for β<∞, with special regard to the eﬀects of the growth rate of money supply, ψ,
and the level of exogenous rigidity, β.W eﬁnd that for β<∞, the money growth rate ψ
has two clear-cut countervailing eﬀects on economic growth which operate through money
growth’s inﬂuence on relative prices.
Negative past relative price eﬀect of money growth As reﬂected in the term
[(µ + β)/(µ + β − αψ)]
−1 on the LHS of equation (37), a positive rate of money growth
allows for growth-reducing-eﬀects of a given level of rigidity: For ψ =0 , rigidity is inef-
fective.51 Firms optimally set their price as a markup over marginal cost, i.e. wages. As
by equation (36) the rate of wage growth equals the growth rate of money supply, ω = ψ,
marginal cost is constant for ψ =0and thus, intermediate goods producers have no desire
to readjust prices. The level of exogenous price rigidity β is without importance. All ﬁrms
charge the same relative price P∗/P (τ) and consequently, quality-adjusted demand, which













Given that all quality-weighted intermediate goods have the same elasticity of substitution
in the production of the ﬁnal good, production is eﬃcient.
A positive value of ψ causes positive growth of marginal cost and of the optimal price.
This means that because of past price rigidity there is a dispersion of prices between
51The equation for the equilibrium research intensity (37) reduces to the equation without rigidity, (41).
52Cf. to equation (3).
23ﬁrms that have recently adjusted their price and those whose price has been ﬁxed for
a long time. Due to the rigidity, most intermediate goods are sold at prices set in the










P(τ) . Therefore, demand is distorted: cheap old intermediate
goods are substituted for expensive new ones. Given the constant quality-weighted elasti-
city of substitution of intermediate goods in the production of the ﬁnal good, this causes
a deviation from the technically eﬃcient mix of inputs. Consequently, the same amount
of ﬁnal goods is now produced with a higher input of intermediate goods.53 This higher
aggregate demand for intermediate goods translates into an increased demand for labour
in the intermediate goods sector, which at given µ is only compatible with labour market
equilibrium for a smaller size of the ﬁnal good sector. Since demand for each intermediate
good is proportional to the size of the ﬁnal goods sector, price rigidity reduces demand
for goods produced by new intermediate sector ﬁrms and therefore, their proﬁts. The
incentive to innovate is lower, causing a lower growth rate for the economy. As reﬂected in
the term [(µ + β)/(µ + β − αψ)]
−1,t h i se ﬀect of exogenous and endogenous price rigidity
(β and µ) on production eﬃciency and a new ﬁrm’s proﬁts is the more pronounced, the
bigger ψ.54 Thus, past price rigidity reduces economic growth. Graphically, an increase
in ψ causes a downward movement of the LHS curve in ﬁgure 3. Note that the eﬀect of
money growth is stronger, the bigger the level of rigidities present in the economy.55
Positive future relative price eﬀect of money growth An increase in the money
growth rate c.p. raises inﬂation π = ψ−γ. Given this growth rate of the price level, a new
ﬁrm’s relative price during periods of ﬁxed prices erodes at rate π, which corresponds to an
increased growth rate of demand απ for the good, i.e., higher proﬁtg r o w t h . 56 The discount
factor for proﬁts in periods with ﬁxed prices, r + µ + β − 2γ − α(ψ − γ), thus decreases.
The fall in the discount rate increases the incentive to engage in research activities, raising
economic growth.57 In ﬁgure 3, this is reﬂe c t e db yt h ef a c tt h a ta ni n c r e a s ei nψ causes
a downward movement of the RHS curve, increasing the equilibrium research intensity.
Analogously to the negative eﬀect, the strength of the positive eﬀect increases with the
53Cf. to equation (14) to see that aggregate demand for intermediate goods to produce a given level of















56The eﬀect of the diminishing price-cost ratio during intervals of ﬁxed prices is compensated by the
ﬁrm’s corrected markup: The markup is chosen such that (given the development of marginal cost) the








24l e v e lo fr i g i d i t y . 58
The presence of potentially oﬀsetting eﬀects is consistent with the ﬁndings of empirical
cross country studies which ﬁnd small and often insigniﬁcant eﬀects of money growth on
economic growth.
In numerical calibrations, we found the net eﬀect to be negative , cf. section 5.
Inﬂuence of the exogenous level of rigidity β The level of exogenous rigidity β
inﬂuences the RHS of equation (37) via the both the discount rate applicable to periods
where prices are sticky and the number of times prices can be reset. The ﬁrstmentioned
discount rate increases in β because the average duration of intervals where prices are
sticky is shortened, which reduces the present value of proﬁts. At the same time, the
number of times prices can be reset rises, increasing proﬁts. In our setting, the ﬁrst eﬀect
dominates such that the compound discount rate increases in β, causing a lower growth
rate. In ﬁgure 1, an increase in β thus causes an upward shift of the RHS-curve.
This inﬂuence is counteracted by a lower level of rigidity-caused distortion: A higher value
of β means that prices can be changed more often, so demand is less distorted towards
cheap old goods, reducing the ineﬃciency in the production of output and increasing
the size of the output sector compatible with labour market equilibrium, as reﬂected in
the term [(µ + β)/(µ + β − αψ)]
−1. Via the resulting increase in demand for the new
good, an increase in β raises the incentive to innovate and therefore, the growth rate. In
ﬁgure 1, this is reﬂected by an upward shift of the LHS-curve.59 Which of the two eﬀects
dominates is ambiguous. In numerical examples, the negative eﬀect of rigidity dominates,
cf. to section 5.
All other parameters have the standard inﬂuences on growth: As the household’s rate
of time preference ρ increases, the interest rate r rises, raising the discount rate for a new
ﬁrm’s proﬁts. This has a negative eﬀect on the equilibrium research intensity and growth
rate, reﬂected by a downward movement of the RHS curve in ﬁgure 1. Further, as in
t h em o d e lw i t h o u tm o n e y ,w eh a v eas c a l ee ﬀect of the size of the research-productivity-
adjusted labour force L/λ on the ﬁrm’s proﬁts and hence, the economy’s growth rate.60
In ﬁgure 1, an increase in L/λ causes an upward movement of the LHS curve, thereby







59Note that this eﬀect applies to the level of both exogenous rigidity β and endogenous rigidity µ:I f
prices can only be changed infrequently, innovation and the resulting price change act as a substitution for





255C a l i b r a t i n g t h e m o d e l
We use standard parameter values from the literature and use steady state considerations
to calibrate our model. Following standard NNS and RBC usage, the household’s inter-
temporal rate of substitution η−1 i sa s s u m e dt ob es u c ht h a tη ∈ [0.5;1].W e c h o o s e
α ∈ (6,11) such that the markup in a steady state with constant marginal cost α/(α − 1)
is between 10% and 20%, as is common in the literature. 61 The parameter q indicates the
size of the quality improvements made by innovating ﬁrms, we choose a 10% improvement
in existing products. Based on empirical ﬁndings, prices are reported to be ﬁxed for two to
ﬁve quarters in the literature.62 In our model, the average interval of ﬁx e dp r i c e si sp a r t l y






. Based on our choice of q and
the range of values for α,w ec h o o s eβ ∈ (1,2). Given that γ is nonnegative, this entails
an upper bound on price rigidity of one year when growth is at its minimum. Further,
the household’s discount rate is ρ =0 .035.W et h e nc a l i b r a t eL/λ such that in the steady
state with constant marginal cost, the growth rate is γ =0 .02.
For our baseline case, we have chosen the following constellation:
Parameter value Parameter value
η 2 β 1.25
α 8 q 1.1
ρ 0.035 L/λ 0.38365
At this parameter constellation, we have that the growth rate γ is a decreasing function
of the money supply growth rate ψ, the rigidity-induced distortion eﬀect clearly dominates
the individual relative price eﬀect.
In line with the empirical literature, the net eﬀect of an increase in the money growth
rate is small: Increasing the annual money growth rate from 1% to 10% reduces economic
growth from 1.99% to 1.73% p.a.63
Individually, the two eﬀects are much more sizeable: Holding constant the positive
eﬀect of money growth on economic growth, the negative eﬀect of an increase of ψ from
61Cf. e.g. to Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan [200]. Markups of this dimension are reported for the US by
Basu and Fernald [1995, 1997] and for Germany by Linnemann [1999].
62Taylor [2000] summarises the empirical literature as indicating one year as the average frequency of
price changes. Based on these empirical ﬁndings, prices are assumed to be ﬁx e df o ro n ey e a ri nt h eb a s e l i n e
calibrations of many DSGE models such as Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan [2000]. Yet recent empirical
research ﬁnds shorter periods of rigid prices: Blinder et al [1998 ] indicate an average time between price
changes of nine months for US ﬁrms while the result of Bils and Klenow [2004] is under six months.
63For example, Barro [1996] reports that a 10 percentage point increase in inﬂation (M1 growth) reduces
annual GDP growth by about 0.24 (0.23) percentage points in a panel regression covering data from over
100 countries for the period 1960-1990. Fischer [1993] reports results of a similar magnitude.
261% to 10% reduces the growth rate by some 1.23 percentage points to 0.76%. At the same
time, holding constant the negative eﬀect, the positive eﬀect of the increase in ψ on the
growth rate amounts to 1.30 percentage points (the growth rate would be 3.29%).
The net eﬀect of rigidity on growth is negative: Decreasing β from β =1 .25 to β =0 .75
at a given money growth rate reduces economic growth slightly (For ψ =0 .01,t h eg r o w t h
rate drops from 1.986% to 1.983%). The eﬀect of rigidity on growth is stronger for higher
r a t e so fm o n e yg r o w t ha n dv i c ev e r s a . F o rψ =0 .1, the growth rate drops from 1.732%
to 1.669% when β is decreased from β =1 .25 to β =1 .15. The drop in the growth
rate resulting from an increase of ψ from 1% to 10% growth is -.31 percentage points at
β =1 .15, compared to -.26 percentage points at β =1 .25.
Varying the underlying parameters in the ranges indicated above did not bring about
qualitative changes in the results.
6S t a b i l i t y
So far, the system has been investigated for its local stability properties at the steady states
corresponding to the cases without price rigidity (β →∞ )a n dt h ec a s ew i t hm a x i m u m
rigidity (β =0 ). For this purpose, the model’s variables have been transformed such that
they are constant at steady state. The ﬁrst order conditions have then been approximated
around the respective steady state using a linear Taylor approximation.




both jump variables when prices are ﬂexible.64 We ﬁnd that both eigenvalues of the system
are positive such that the system is saddle-path stable.65
For β =0 , the system consists of the variables Y
Q, m
Q, µ, π and e w = w
PQ where the
variable reﬂecting real money holdings m
Q is now predetermined. Due to the system’s di-
mension, the stability properties cannot be analysed analytically. Starting from a baseline
calibration and then varying parameters, we checked some numerical examples and found
the relevant steady state to be locally stable but indeterminate.66
This implies that the system has some Keynesian features that might be of interest for
the joint analysis of growth and business cycles. We aim to address this question in the




65Note that for systems that only contain jump variables, the constellation with all eigenvalues being
positive is the equivalent of saddle path stability, although the stable arm is of dimension zero. Cf. to
Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe [2001]) for details.
66Note that for β =0there exists a second steady state associated with a smaller value of the research
intensity (Cf. footnote 43). We found this steady state to be locally stable and determinate in the majority
of cases, while it was stable but indeterminate in eight examined cases.
27intermediate cases (0 <β<∞).
7C o n c l u s i o n
We ﬁnd that the Schumpeterian growth model with small nominal frictions has a unique
steady state. In this steady state, money growth determines the growth rate of prices
optimally charged by intermediate goods ﬁrms. Price rigidity leads to disparity in the
prices charged by ﬁrms and thereby to two countervailing eﬀects of money growth on
productivity growth: Demand is distorted towards cheap ‘old’ intermediate goods’, which
leads to ineﬃcient output production and a reduction in the demand for new intermediate
goods, lowering the incentive to innovate. Yet inﬂation erodes the relative price of a new
intermediate good in periods where its price is ﬁxed, boosting demand for the good and
leading thus to a rise in the incentive to innovate. Both eﬀects of rigidity increase in
money growth. In our calibrations, the negative eﬀect of money growth and price rigidity
on economic growth dominates, with moderate inﬂation rates causing a sizeable reduction
in the rate of economic growth.
From a normative point of view, growth may be both higher or lower than optimal in
the underlying frictionless Aghion-Howitt model. A natural next step will be to analyse
the welfare implications of inﬂation in the present model: Does inﬂation increase or reduce
the wedge between the social optimal growth rate and the decentral growth rate?
8A p p e n d i x
Appendix 1 Final goods sector cost minimization problem
The ﬁrm’s problem is to chose intermediate good quantities xkj (τ) to minimise the pro-






























The Lagrange multiplier on the quantity constraint is the output price P as the multiplier
has the interpretation of the marginal cost of one additional unit of output, which is

































when L is maximised with respect to xkj(τ) and the Lagrange multiplier P (τ), respectively.
Using (43) in (42) and solving for xkj(τ) leads to equation (3) in the main text.
The form of the price index P (τ) can be derived as follows: Multiplying condition (42)
with xkj(τ) > 0 and aggregating over intermediate products j results in
N X
j=1



































which can be rearranged to yield equation (4) in the main text. Note that this price
corresponds to the minimum cost of obtaining one unit of Y (τ).
Appendix 2 Probabilities for an intermediate good producing ﬁrm’s pricing
problem
When entering the market, a ﬁrm in sector j sets a price to maximise the discounted
sum of proﬁts Gkj(s) for each future period s weighted by the probability Pr(s) that the
ﬁrm has not been replaced and has not received a signal to reset its price by period s.A st h e
two events ‘reset signal’ and ‘innovation’ are governed by two distinct Poisson processes,
they are stochastically independent such that we can express the joint probability as the










D(τ) is the cumulative density function for the probability that the date of the next
innovation in sector j, tkj+1,w i l lp r e c e d et i m eτ, given that the last innovation was
generated at time tkj: D(τ)=p(tkj+1 ≤ τ). Then the probability of not having been
replaced by another ﬁrm by time τ is 1−D(τ).W eﬁnd the function D(τ) by ﬁrst noticing
that its time derivative,
dD(τ)
dτ ,e q u a l st h eﬂow probability of an innovation occurring at
29time τ, which is the parameter of the homogeneous Poisson process, µkj, given that no
innovation was generated between tkj and τ:
dD(τ)
dτ
=( 1− D(τ))µkj (45)
We then deﬁne e D(τ) as the probability density of an innovation being generated after time




dτ . Using (45) gives
d h D(τ)
dτ + e D(τ)µkj =0 .
This ﬁrst-order linear diﬀerential equation has the solution
e D(τ)=Ae
−µkj(τ−tkj) (46)
where A is a constant. The probability of two innovations occurring at the same time is
negligible, so D(tkj)=0which implies e D(tkj)=1 . U s i n gt h ef a c tt h a ttkj+1 ≥ tkj and
the boundary condition in (46) yields A =1and the solution
e D(τ)=1− D(τ)=e
−µkj(τ−tkj)
Analogously, given a Poisson process with parameter β, the probability of not receiving a
reset signal between times τ and s is 1−B (τ)= e Be
−β(τ−tkj). Since we have no information
about the time the last reset signal was received in the sector, we cannot deﬁnitize the
constant e B. Thus, the joint probability that the ﬁrm has not been replaced and has






(τ−tkj)which leads to equation (7) in the text.
Appendix 3 Solution of an intermediate good producing ﬁrm’s optimal pricing
problem
The ﬁrm chooses a price Pkj(τ) to maximise the present value of proﬁts when entering
the market, given by (8). Using stationary growth of output Y , output price P and wage




























Solving the integral and rearranging yields equation (9). It is trivial to show that the
second order condition for a maximum holds.
Appendix 4 A new intermediate good producing ﬁrm’s market value
30The ﬁrm’s market value is the discounted sum of proﬁts from future periods s where
the proﬁts are weighted due to two independent sources of uncertainty: The ﬁr s tw e i g h ti s
given by the probability e−µ(s−τ) of not having been replaced by time s. The second source
of uncertainty is given by the ﬁrm’s price in period s: The price charged can be any P∗ (θ)
with θ ∈ (τ,s) depending on whether any reset signal for the price was received between
τ and s and when it was received. Thus, the price charged at time s can be represented
as a weighted sum of the past optimal prices, where the weights are as follows: The ﬂow
probability that a signal to reset prices was received in period θ is β. With probability
e−β(s−θ), no signal was received between θ and s.67 As these two events are independent,
the probability of having last reset one’s price due to a pricing signal at θ ∈ (τ,s) is
βe−β(s−θ). Additionally, if no reset signal has been received up to period s,t h eﬁrm’s







.S i n c e t h e
processes for innovations and reset signals are independent, the joint probability of the
described events takes on the multiplicative form reﬂected in equation (11).
Making use of the fact that the optimal price grows with the growth rate of marginal
cost, ω, and solving the integrals associated with the price at time s yields
























where we deﬁne χ = i+µ−απ−γ and A(τ)=qkj(α−1)Y (τ)P (τ)
α. Using again constant
growth of P∗ and rearranging terms, we have
E (Vj |τ )=A(τ)
P∗ (τ)
1−α

























Solving the remaining integrals, we have






















χ + β − ω
¸¾
Expanding the fractions inside the brackets, we have
E (Vj |τ )=A(τ)P∗ (τ)
−α χ + β +( α − 1)ω







χ + β − ω
¸
67H e r e ,w eh a v eb e e na b l et od e ﬁnitize the constant h B =1since we know that the probability of receiving
two or more signals at time θ is negligible, such that B(θ)=0 .
31Finally using the equation for the optimal price (9) and reinserting χ = i + µ − απ − γ
and A(τ)=qkj(α−1)Y (τ)P (τ)
α we have equation (12) in the main text.
Appendix 5 The Intermediate good sector’s labour demand









where dk (τ) is the number of sectors at quality rung k at time τ
Following (Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe [2001a] and [2001b], Leith andWren-
Lewis [2000] and Wolman [1999]), the average price eﬀective at time τ c a nb ee x p r e s s e da s
a weighted average of past optimal prices, where the weights e f (s,τ) refer to the probability









As the timing of innovations is independent of a sector’s position on the quality ladder


























e f (s,τ)P∗(s)−αds (47)
Ap r i c ei ne ﬀect at time τ dates from time s if there was either an innovation or a
pricing signal at time s and if there was no innovation between times s and τ and if no
pricing signal was received in the same period. As explained in appendix 2, Innovations and
pricing signals are governed by two independent Poisson processes with parameters µ and
β, respectively. Thus, the probability of an innovation (not) occurring is independent from
the probability of a pricing signal (not) being received. Therefore, the probability of no
innovation and no pricing signal between times s and τ is e−µ(τ−s)e−β(τ−s) = e−(µ+β)(τ−s).
The ﬂow probability of an innovation or a pricing signal occurring at time s is µ+β.T h u s ,
we have e f (s,τ)=( µ + β)e−(µ+β)(τ−s). Using this and steady growth of P∗ at rate ω in










32Solving the integral which converges for µ+β>α ωleads to equation () in the main text.
Appendix 6 Development of the aggregate Quality index
































where a hat denotes the proportional growth rate of variable x, b x =
dx/dt
x . The growth rate
of the sum in equation (48) is equal to the sum of the individual growth rates weighted
















The expected value of the product of two random variables is given by E [XY]=











































































As was shown in section 2.3, the probability of an innovation being made and thus























The Law of large numbers implies that for a large number N of sectors, the actual





68For example, \ X + Y =
·
(X+Y )
X+Y = e X
X
X+Y + e Y
Y
X+Y .
33More precisely, a standard version of the law of large numbers for independent and identic-





= σ2 states that
t h es a m p l em e a nY T =( 1 /T)
PT
t=1 Yt converges in probability to the population mean
µ. Y T has expectation µ and variance E
h¡
Y T − µ
¢2i
= σ2/T . This variance goes to
zero as T →∞implying Y T
p
→ µ. Cf. e.g. Hamilton [1994]. In the present context, the
weighting factors (q(α−1)kj(τ)/Q(τ)(α−1)) are not constant as in the standard case (1/T).
Yet their being small and summing up to unity suﬃces for the result to carry over to our
case. Thus, we have equation (20) in the main text.
Appendix 7 The growth rate of wages at steady state
Analogously to the procedure in appendix 5, the output price (4) at steady state can
be rewritten as




>From (9), we have that the optimal price at steady state grows at rate ω, such that











µ + β − (α − 1)ω
(49)
where we require µ + β − (α − 1)ω>0 for the integral to converge.














ω = π + γ
The wage growth rate at the steady state equals the sum of inﬂation and growth rate,
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h a tγQ = γ at the steady state.
Appendix 8 Household’s budget constraint




























































































The household’s nominal wealth V (τ) consists of his money and bond holdings, V (τ)=




P(τ) .T h e





























Using this, the budget constraint can be rewritten as in equation (30).
Appendix 9 Household’s optimization problem
We deﬁne z(τ) as the fraction of the household’s real wealth invested in bonds: z(τ)=
PB(τ)B(τ)
P(τ)
v(τ) and rewrite utility function and budget constraint (50) accordingly. The house-
hold’s problem consists in choosing optimal paths for consumption {c}
∞
τ=0 and the invest-
ment strategy {z}
∞
τ=0 to maximise the utility function (28) subject to the budget constraint
(30). We set up the current-value Hamiltonian
H =
n








L + Treal + rzv − c − π(1 − z)v
i
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dz(τ)v(τ)=
PB(τ)B(τ)
P(τ) and [1 − z(τ)]v(τ)=m(τ). c and z are the
household’s control variables, ξ is the co-state variable and v is the state variable with an
initial value v(0) =
V (0)




c1−θ [(1 − z)v]
θ
o−η
(1 − θ)c−θ [(1 − z)v]
θ − ξ =0or
n
c1−θ [(1 − z)v]
θ
o−η
(1 − θ)c−θ [(1 − z)v]




c1−θ [(1 − z)v]
θ
o−η
θc1−θ [(1 − z)v]
θ−1 (−v)+ξ (rv + πv)=0or
n
c1−θ [(1 − z)v]
θ
o−η





ξ − ρξ = −∂H
∂v = −
n




θ−1 (1 − z)c1−θ − ξ [rz − π (1 − z)] or
·
ξ − ρξ = −
n




θ−1 (1 − z)c1−θ − ξ [rz − π(1 − z)] (53)
Substituting the LHS of (52) for ξ in (51), we have
n
c1−θ [(1 − z)v]
θ
o−η
(1 − θ)c−θ [(1 − z)v]
θ =
n
c1−θ [(1 − z)v]
θ
o−η
θc1−θ [(1 − z)v]
θ−1 1
r+π
⇒ r + π = θ
1−θc[(1 − z)v]
−1
Substituting m =( 1− z)v we have equation (31) in the text.
Substituting for
n
c1−θ [(1 − z)v]
θ
o−η
θc1−θ [(1 − z)v]
θ−1 in the RHS of (53) using (52)
yields
·








= −(r − ρ)




−[η(1 − θ)+θ]c−[η(1−θ)+θ]−1mθ(1−η) ·























Equating both expressions for
·
ξ/ξ yields equation (32) in the text.
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